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THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE DEBATE OVER
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S CITATION OF
FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Yitzchok Segal*

BACKGROUND
Is it appropriate to use foreign and international law to interpret the
United States Constitution? Should the United States Supreme Court be
permitted to cite foreign and international law in interpreting the U.S.
These questions have generated much interest and
Constitution? 1

* I would like to thank John Feerick, Professor and former Dean, Fordham University
School of Law, and Daniel Richman, Professor, Fordham University School of Law, for
their remarks on an earlier draft of this Comment. I would also like to thank Martin
Flaherty, Professor, Fordham University School of Law, for some valuable suggestions that
were incorporated into this Comment.
1. For the purposes of this Comment, “international law” may be understood as the law
that binds nation-states; “foreign law” may be understood as the law of other sovereign
nation-states; and “comparative law” may be understood as all non-U.S. legal materials,
including both international and foreign law.
It is also critical to clarify the parameters of the issue. The debate over the Supreme
Court’s use of comparative law has generally been limited to its use as persuasive evidence;
most ardent proponents of citing comparative materials do not suggest that the Court may
cite foreign and international law in purely domestic issues as controlling precedent. For
example, Justice Breyer is perhaps the Court’s most vocal proponent of using comparative
legal materials in U.S. constitutional interpretation, yet even he has stated that these
materials are not controlling. See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 996 (1999) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (stating “[o]bviously this foreign authority does not bind us”), overruled by
Moore v. Kinney, 278 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2002); see also, e.g., Vicki Jackson, Yes Please,
I’d Love to Talk With You, LEGAL AFF., July-Aug. 2004, at 44 (“[T]he Court’s recent
references to foreign decisions and practice do not treat them as binding.”). But see Martin
S. Flaherty, Judicial Globalization in the Service of Self-Government, 20 ETHICS & INT’L
AFF. J. (forthcoming 2006). My thanks to the author for making this article available to me.
Further, both sides of this debate agree that in certain situations comparative
materials are relevant. These situations include interpreting treaties, adjudicating a case
involving a choice-of-law provision in a contract on which the U.S. suit is based, cases
involving the constitutional provision authorizing Congress to “punish Offences against the
Law of the Nations,” cases involving admiralty law, and asylum cases where a foreign
decision reveals that a foreign nation persecutes members of an asylum-seeking ethnic
group. See, e.g., Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL
AFF., July-Aug. 2004, at 40; Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address, Foreign Legal Authority in
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controversy. While many justices and commentators endorse citations to
foreign and international law, others have argued that it is inappropriate to
interpret the U.S. Constitution based on non-U.S. law. 2
Indeed, the appropriateness of using foreign and international law in
interpreting the U.S. Constitution is arguably the most controversial
jurisprudential issue in recent years. It has invoked impassioned rhetoric
and violent death threats aimed at Justice Ginsburg and former Justice
O’Connor 3 and has spawned an impressive, ever-growing body of literature
comprised of articles by justices, 4 legal commentators, 5 and journalists.6

the Federal Courts, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 305 (2004) [hereinafter Scalia, Keynote
Address]; Harvie Wilkinson III, The Use of International Law in Judicial Decisions, 27
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 423 (2004).
In sum, the issue is: is it appropriate for the Supreme Court to cite foreign and
international law as persuasive evidence in purely domestic issues?
To a significant extent, this debate hinges on larger issues such as the purpose of the
Constitution, the usefulness of comparative constitutional analysis, and the proper method
of the interpretation of the Constitution. See, e.g., Louis J. Blum, Comment, Mixed Signals:
The Limited Role of Comparative Analysis in Constitutional Adjudication, 39 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 157, 200 n.15 (2002); Donald E. Childress III, Note, Using Comparative
Constitutional Law to Resolve Domestic Federal Questions, 53 DUKE L.J. 193 (2003)
(relating the differing judicial opinions in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) to the
interpretive posture of the justices); Jackson, supra at 46; Seth F. Kreimer, Invidious
Comparisons: Some Cautionary Remarks on the Process of Constitutional Borrowing, 1 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 640 (1999) (arguing that the receptiveness of a system of constitutional law
to borrowings from other systems will depend on the constitutional model employed); Mark
Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 239, 241 (2003)
[hereinafter Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law] (relating the debate over
the relevance of non-U.S. law to constitutional interpretation to the broader debates over the
proper interpretation of the Constitution). A historical overview of several dominant
interpretive theories is provided by PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1982). For a recent attempt to describe the debate over constitutional
interpretive methods, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87
CAL. L. REV. 535 (1999).
2. See infra notes 3-4.
3. Former Judge Robert Bork, for example, has called the Court’s recent citations to
foreign and international law “risible,” “absurd,” and “flabbergasting.” Robert H. Bork,
Whose Constitution is it Anyway?, NAT’L REV., Dec. 8, 2003, at 37 [hereinafter Bork,
Whose Constitution?]; Robert H. Bork, Has The Supreme Court Gone Too Far? (October
2003),
available
at
http://www.committeeforjustice.org/contents/news/news100103_commentary.shtml
[hereinafter Bork, Gone Too Far?]. Both former Justice O’Connor and Justice Ginsburg
have been threatened with death because of their comparative law citations. Posting of
Mickey
McLean
to
World
Views
blog,
http://www.worldmagblog.com/blog/archives/023255.html (Mar. 16, 2006, 1:12 EST).
4. Judges who have written or spoken on this subject outside of judicial opinions
include Shirley S. Abrahamson & Michael J. Fischer, All the World’s a Courtroom: Judging
in the New Millennium, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273 (1997); Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme
Court and the Law of the Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39 (1994); Stephen Breyer, Keynote
Address, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265 (2003) [hereinafter Breyer, Keynote Address];
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Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative
Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 329 (2004); Ruth
Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human
Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253 (1999); Michael Kirby, Think Globally, 4 GREEN
BAG 2D 287 (2001); Sandra Day O’Connor, Broadening Our Horizons: Why American
Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, 45 FED. LAW. 20 (1998); Sandra Day O’Connor,
Keynote Address: Proceedings of the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society
of International Law, in 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 348 (2002) [hereinafter O’Connor,
Keynote Address]; Claire L’Heureux-Dubè, Remark, The Importance of Dialogue:
Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15
(1998); Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, What Role Should Foreign Practice and Precedent Play
in the Interpretation of Domestic Law?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1893 (2005); Posner,
supra note 1; William H. Rehnquist, Foreword to DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at vii, viii-ix (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2002);
William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts—Comparative Remarks, in GERMANY AND ITS
BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE: A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411, 412 (Paul
Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993); Patricia M. Wald, The Use of International
Law in the American Adjudicative Process, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 431 (2004);
Wilkinson, supra note 1; Bork, Whose Constitution?, supra note 3; Bork, Gone Too Far?,
supra note 3; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”:
The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication (Feb. 7, 2006),
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_02-07b-06.html
[hereinafter
Ginsburg, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind]; Sandra Day O’Connor,
Remarks to the Southern Center for International Studies (Oct. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.southerncenter.org/OConnor_transcript.pdf; Sandra Day O’Connor, O’Connor
Extols
Role
of
International
Law
(Oct.
27,
2004),
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/10/27/scotus.oconnor.ap; Scalia, Keynote Address, supra
note 1; Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, Discussion on the Constitutional Relevance of
Foreign Court Decisions at the American University Washington College of Law (Jan. 13,
2005), available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/supctLawScaliaBreyer.pdf
[hereinafter Scalia & Breyer, Discussion on the Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court
Decisions].
5. Articles discussing the debate over citations to foreign and international law as well
as the value of comparative sources in U.S. constitutional interpretation include Bruce
Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771 (1997); T. Alexander
Aleinkoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutionalism: Reflections on
the Customary International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 91 (2004); Roger P. Alford,
Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. J. INT’L
L. 675 (2003) [hereinafter Alford, Federal Courts]; Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts,
International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference: A Postscript on Lawrence v.
Texas, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 913 (2004) [hereinafter Alford, Postscript on Lawrence]; Roger P.
Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 57
(2004) [hereinafter Alford, Misusing]; Osmar J. Benvenuto, Note, Reevaluating the Debate
Surrounding the Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Precedent, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2695
(2006); Blum, supra note 1; Childress, supra note 1; Lawrence Connell, The Supreme
Court, Foreign Law, and Constitutional Governance, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 59 (2004); Sujit
Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative
Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999); Flaherty, supra note 1; David
Fontana, The Next Generation of Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law Scholarship:
A Reply to Professor Tushnet, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 445 (2004) [hereinafter Fontana, The
Next Generation]; David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA
L. REV. 539 (2001); Rex D. Glensy, Which Countries Count?: Lawrence v. Texas and the
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Outside the pages of the Court’s official reporter, several Justices have
spoken publicly about the proper role of comparative legal materials in
U.S. constitutional interpretation.7 For instance, in a rare public debate,
Supreme Court Justices Stephen Breyer and Antonin Scalia argued the
merits of citing foreign and international law in the Court’s opinions.8
Recently, at the nomination hearings of Justices John Roberts and Samuel
Alito, senators fired questions at the candidates regarding the role of
comparative legal materials, probing them to publicly announce their views
on this explosive issue. 9

Selection of Foreign Persuasive Authority, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 357 (2005); Sarah K. Harding,
Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 409 (2003); Jackson,
supra note 1; Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism:
Opening Up the Conversation on “Proportionality,” Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 583 (1999); Mark W. Janis, Dred Scott and International Law, 43 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 763 (2005); Ken I. Kersch, The New Legal Transnationalism, the
Globalized Judiciary, and the Rule of Law, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 345 (2005);
Harold Hongju Koh, International Law As Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43 (2004)
[hereinafter Koh, International Law]; Kreimer, supra note 1; David S. Law, Generic
Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652 (2005); Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad When
Interpreting the U.S. Constitution: Some Reflections, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353 (2004); Gerald
L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT’L
L. 82 (2004); Matthew S. Raalf, Note, A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing: Why the Debate
Surrounding Comparative Constitutional Law is Spectacularly Ordinary, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1239 (2004); Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights:
Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 69 (2004); Leila Nadya Sadat, An
American Vision for Global Justice: Taking the Rule of (International) Law Seriously, 4
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 329 (2005); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of
Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225 (1999); Tushnet,
Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, supra note 1.
6. Articles discussing this issue in the popular press are legion. See, e.g., Ann
Althouse, Innocence Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2005, at A25; Elizabeth Greathouse,
Justices See Joint Issues with the EU, WASH. POST, July 9, 1998, at A24; Anne E. Kornblut,
Justice Ginsburg Backs Value of Foreign Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2005, at A10; Charles
Lane, Thinking Outside The U.S., WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2003, at A13; Felix G. Rohatyn, OpEd, Dead to the World, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at A23; Jeffrey Toobin, Swinging Shift:
How Anthony Kennedy’s Passion for Foreign Law Could Change the Supreme Court, NEW
YORKER,
Sept.
12,
2005,
at
42,
available
at
http://www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/050912fa_fact.
7. Presentations by Supreme Court Justices include Breyer, Keynote Address, supra
note 4; O’Connor, Keynote Address, supra note 4; Scalia, Keynote Address, supra note 1;
Ginsburg, A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind, supra note 4; Scalia &
Breyer, Discussion on the Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions, supra note
4.
8. Scalia & Breyer, Discussion on the Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court
Decisions, supra note 4.
9. A complete transcript of the Roberts hearings may be found at http://www.postgazette.com/pg/05257/571043.stm (last visited Oct. 12, 2006); a complete transcript of the
Alito
hearings
may
be
found
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/01/10/AR2006011000781.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2006).
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Perhaps most strikingly, citations to foreign and international law by
U.S. courts have provoked the proposal of a congressional resolution
stating that “judicial determinations regarding the meaning of the laws of
the United States should not be based in whole or in part on judgments,
laws, or pronouncements of foreign institutions . . . .” 10 Similarly, the
Court’s citations to comparative legal materials have provoked the proposal
of a bill by several senators stating that in interpreting the Constitution, a
court may not rely on “any constitution, law, administrative rule, Executive
Order, directive, policy, judicial decision, or any other action of any foreign
state or international organization or agency, other than English
constitutional and common law.” 11
The Supreme Court’s use of foreign and international law in interpreting
the Constitution is not itself revolutionary; throughout its history, the Court
has freely drawn on supranational law.12 Thus, it is not the Court’s mere

10. H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong. (2004); Press Release, Rep. Tom Feeney, Reaffirmation
of American Independence Resolution Approved (May 13, 2004), available at
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/fl24_feeney/ResConstitutionSubPassage.shtml.
The
Resolution states:
Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that judicial
determinations regarding the meaning of the laws of the United States should not
be based in whole or in part on judgments, laws, or pronouncements of foreign
institutions unless such foreign judgments, laws, or pronouncements are
incorporated into the legislative history of laws passed by the elected legislative
branches of the United States or otherwise inform an understanding of the original
meaning of the laws of the United States.
H.R. Res. 568.
The preface to the resolution states that inappropriate judicial reliance on foreign
laws threatens the separation of powers. Id. The resolution’s sponsor has even suggested
that a Justice’s failure to comply with the resolution may constitute grounds for
impeachment. Tom Curry, A Flap Over Foreign Matter at the Supreme Court, MSNBC,
Mar. 11, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4506232/. Regarding the resolution, see
Appropriate Role of Foreign Judgments in the Interpretation of American Law: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 67
(2004),
available
at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_house_hearings&docid=f:92673.wais; Hadar Harris, “We Are
the World”—or Are We? The United States’ Conflicting Views on the Use of International
and Foreign Legal Decisions, 12 NO. 3 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 5 (2005), available at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/12/123.pdf?rd=1; Jeffrey McDermott, Citation to
Foreign Precedent: Congress vs. The Courts, 51 FED. LAW. 20 (2004). A related
congressional bill threatening to prohibit any reference to foreign materials has also been
introduced. See H.R. Res. 3799, 108th Cong. (2004).
11. This bill is called the Constitution Restoration Act of 2004. S. 2323, 108th Cong.
(2004).
12. See, e.g., Alan A. Levasseur, The Use of Comparative Law by Courts, in THE USE OF
COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS 315, 325-31 (Ulrich Drobing & Sjef van Erp eds., 1997);
Connell, supra note 5, at 69; Glensy, supra note 5, at 361-73; Neuman, supra note 5, at 8284.
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use of comparative legal sources that has sparked the recent debate, it is the
context of these references. The Court has recently cited foreign and
international law to support key positions in high-profile cases dealing with
hyper-sensitive domestic issues, including the death penalty. 13 The Court
has more than once abrogated its holdings in prior decisions, in part due to
foreign and international law. 14 These references seem to indicate a
conscious movement toward a transnational adjudication model and have
impelled the dramatic controversy over the relevance of foreign and
international law in U.S. constitutional interpretation.15
The Supreme Court is sharply divided into two opposing factions
regarding the function of comparative legal sources in the U.S. legal
system. 16 Within the past two decades alone, the relevance of comparative
legal sources in U.S. constitutional interpretation has been contested, at
times quite heatedly, in eight Supreme Court cases.17
The split among the Supreme Court Justices has primarily occurred
along the liberal/conservative ideological divide—liberal-minded Justices
tend toward the internationalist camp while conservative-minded Justices
tend toward the nationalist camp. For example, in the highly contentious
Lawrence v. Texas decision, Justice Kennedy led a majority of the Court in
holding that a Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same
13. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 604 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 598 (2003); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
14. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins, 536 U.S. at 304;
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), abrogated by Roper, 543 U.S. at 551; Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), abrogated by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
15. See, e.g., Janet Koven Levitt, Going Public with Transnational Law: The 2002-2003
Supreme Court Term, 39 TULSA L. REV. 155, 155 (2003) (“The Court’s international and
foreign law citations were not, in and of themselves, revolutionary or ‘breakthrough.’ It was
the Court’s decision to use such citations in the highest profile, potentially most
controversial cases . . . .”). During the last twenty years, the Court has used comparative
materials in Eighth Amendment cases, substantive due process cases, federalism cases, and
equal protection cases. See Glensy, supra note 5, at 373-87 (cataloging these cases). The
Court’s recent use of comparative legal sources has been more extensive than in the past.
See, e.g., Ruti Teitel, Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global Age, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2570 (2004); Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, supra note 1, at 245
(“[R]eferences to non-U.S. constitutional law have become more frequent in recent
years . . . .”).
16. See Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, supra note 1, at 245
(“Four Justices—Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer—have adverted to non-U.S. law
in their opinions, while three—Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas—have written opinions
expressly criticizing references to non-U.S. law.”); see also supra note 4.
17. Roper, 543 U.S. 551; Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990
(2002); Atkins, 536 U.S. 304; Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); see also Patterson v. Texas, 536 U.S. 984, 984 (2002)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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sex to engage in certain sexual conduct was unconstitutional as applied to
two adult males who had privately engaged in consensual sodomy. 18 The
Lawrence holding overruled the Court’s prior decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick. 19 In support of its decision, the majority noted that the
European Court of Human Rights has not followed Bowers and that
“[o]ther nations, too, have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the
protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual
conduct.” 20 Countering Kennedy’s majority opinion, Justices Scalia,
Rehnquist, and Thomas filed a dissenting opinion vigorously objecting to
the majority’s citations of comparative law.21 The dissent denigrated the
majority’s citation of foreign law, labeling it “meaningless and dangerous
dicta.” 22 In support of its opinion, the dissent proclaimed that “this
Court . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions, on
Americans.” 23
This Comment examines the role that foreign and international law has
played in the Court’s death penalty cases. Part I of this Comment provides
background and explains the relevance of foreign and international law in
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Part II forms the core of this Comment
and argues that, the sensational degree of controversy notwithstanding,
foreign and international law have been peripheral to the Court’s death
penalty decisions. It demonstrates that in capital punishment jurisprudence,
comparative materials function, if at all, merely as a minor consideration in
a multifaceted analysis. It further argues that the Court develops, adopts,
and sustains a “national consensus” analytical paradigm in its death penalty
decisions and that this calculated paradigm severely constrains the judicial
impact of these comparative materials. Part III of this Comment presents
the position of death penalty abolitionists that the Court should grant
foreign and international law supremacy over the national consensus and
argues that this position runs counter to the Court’s consistently sustained
national consensus paradigm. Finally, Part IV of this Comment presents
the view of several commentators that the judicial impact of foreign and
international law on the Court has been exceptionally limited in all
jurisprudential areas, a view that dovetails with the conclusions of this
Comment.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576.
Id. at 598 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. (citing Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
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I. EIGHTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
AND COMPARATIVE LEGAL SOURCES
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence constitutes an area of law in which
foreign and international legal materials have been invoked with great
frequency. Indeed, citations to comparative legal materials have become a
hallmark of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
The suitability of comparative legal materials to Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence derives from the Court’s interpretation of that Amendment.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of “cruel and unusual
punishment.” 24 In two critical cases, Weems v. United States and Trop v.
Dulles, the Court molded the Eighth Amendment, making it ripe for
comparative legal analysis and prone to the citation of comparative legal
materials. 25
Early in the twentieth century, the case of Paul A. Weems confronted the
Supreme Court. 26 Weems falsified public records and was sentenced to
twelve years of hard and painful labor, deprived of many basic rights, and
subjected to a perpetual state of surveillance. 27 In a trail-blazing decision,
the Court maintained that the constitutional clause “cruel and unusual
punishment” must be defined in a dynamic manner based on society’s everdeveloping perceptions of civility. 28 The Court eschewed a static
perception of “cruel and unusual punishment,” stating that its definition is
“not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by humane justice.” 29 Under this interpretation of
the Eighth Amendment, the Court held that Weems’s severe penalty

24. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
25. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion); Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349 (1910). In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822-23 n.7 (1988) (plurality
opinion), the Court explained that the underlying rationale of using national objective
indicators in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is rooted in the very language of the
Constitution. The Court stated:
Our capital punishment jurisprudence has consistently recognized that
contemporary standards, as reflected by the actions of the legislatures and the
juries, provide an important measure of whether the death penalty is “cruel and
unusual.” Part of the rationale for this index of constitutional value lies in the
very language of the construed clause: whether an action is “unusual” depends, in
common usage, upon the frequency of its occurrence or the magnitude of its
acceptance.
Id.
26. Weems, 217 U.S. at 349.
27. Id. at 363-64.
28. Id. at 378.
29. Id.
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amounted to cruel and unusual punishment and was unconstitutional.30
The Court built on its progressive holding in Weems in the landmark
case of Trop v. Dulles. 31 Albert L. Trop, an American soldier serving in
North Africa during 1944, was caught deserting the army and forced to
stand trial. 32 A general court-martial convicted Trop of desertion and
sentenced him to three years of hard labor, forfeiture of all pay and
allowances, and a dishonorable discharge. 33 As a result of his dishonorable
discharge, Trop was refused a passport and was thus effectively denied
American citizenship. 34 Trop sought a declaratory judgment granting him
citizenship and brought his case up the judicial ladder to the Supreme
Court. 35
Chief Justice Warren led a plurality opinion holding that the imposition
of denationalization for army desertion constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment and is unconstitutional.36 Citing Weems as precedent, the
Court maintained that the scope of “cruel and unusual punishment” is
subject to change and encompasses punishments considered cruel and
unusual by mankind’s newfound sensitivities. 37 In Trop’s oft-cited phrase,
the contours of “cruel and unusual punishment” are determined by “the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.” 38 The Court found that the imposition of denationalization as a
punishment violates society’s evolving standards of decency and is
therefore barred by the Eighth Amendment. 39 Trop thus firmly cemented
the progressive interpretive principle that was launched and outlined in
Weems: the meaning of the Eighth Amendment hinges on the standards of
civility in contemporary society.
Yet Trop did more than merely cement this progressive interpretive
principle, it licensed the use of comparative legal materials in Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence.
In illustrating that the imposition of
denationalization violates the Eighth Amendment, the Court invoked
comparative legal materials as an index of society’s standards of decency.40
The Trop Court noted that virtually all the civilized nations of the world
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 381.
356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 87.
Id. at 88.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 100-01.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 100-01.
Id. at 102-03.
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disallow the imposition of denationalization as a punishment and that only
two countries impose denationalization as a penalty for desertion.41 The
Court cited these sources in a blithe, matter-of-fact manner, as if it were
only natural to look to these sources for judicial guidance. Nevertheless,
by employing comparative materials to measure society’s decency
standards, the Warren plurality tacitly recognized that these sources
represent reliable indicators of society’s decency norms, lending the
Court’s imprimatur to comparative legal citations.
Quietly yet
unambiguously, Trop authorized the citation of comparative legal materials
in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 42
Trop’s license to cite foreign and international law has been well-used.
In particular, liberal-minded justices have seized upon this license and have
frequently cited foreign and international legal materials in their capital
punishment opinions. For example, in Atkins v. Virginia, Justice Stevens
filed the majority opinion for the Court and ruled that the execution of
mentally retarded criminals constitutes cruel and unusual punishment as
defined by the evolving standards of decency of a maturing society. 43 In
support of its decision, the Court noted that “[w]ithin the world community,
the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally
retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.” 44 Similarly, in the
celebrated Roper v. Simmons case Justice Kennedy filed the majority
opinion for the Court, holding that the execution of individuals under the
age of eighteen at the time of their capital crimes entails cruel and unusual
punishment as defined by the evolving standards of decency of a maturing
society. 45 As in Atkins, the Court in Roper cited international opinion
against the juvenile death penalty in support of its decision.46
41. Id.
42. In his dissenting opinion in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 325 (2002) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting), the late Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361 (1989) (plurality opinion), the Court rejected the view of Trop that comparative
legal sources are relevant in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Justice Rehnquist
emphasized that the Trop opinion represents a mere plurality of the Court and that the Trop
plurality failed to justify its use of comparative materials. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 325. This
position is difficult to sustain for two reasons. First, Stanford is the only authority that
Justice Rehnquist cites in support of his position—yet even Stanford did not reject the
citations of comparative materials altogether; it merely consigned them to a confirmatory
role. See discussion infra pp. 20-21. Also, though the Trop opinion was signed by a mere
plurality of the Court, the part of the Court’s decision in Stanford that downplays the role of
comparative legal materials was also signed by a mere plurality of the Court, a point Justice
Rehnquist fails to mention. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370 n.1.
43. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
44. Id. at 316 n.21.
45. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005).
46. Id.
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II. THE MARGINALITY OF COMPARATIVE MATERIALS IN DEATH
PENALTY CASES
A careful analysis of the way in which the Court uses comparative
materials in its death penalty cases illustrates their marginal role. While
death penalty cases have provoked much of the controversy over the
citation of foreign and international legal materials, the Court has never
regarded these sources as judicially significant indicators of society’s
decency standards. Because the Court accords only minimal judicial value
to comparative legal materials, these materials have not been pivotal in the
Court’s death penalty decisions.
In death penalty cases, comparative materials function, if at all, merely
as a single consideration in a multidimensional analysis to determine the
meaning of cruel and unusual punishment—and a highly attenuated
consideration at that. Death penalty case law illustrates that the Court has
consciously erected a carefully calibrated hierarchy of sources functioning
as objective indicators of society’s decency standards. The Court
deliberately, meticulously, and consistently sustains this hierarchal
structure. This calculated hierarchical structure is comprised of a mosaic of
sources, including national legislative enactments, national jury sentencing
determinations, and foreign and international law. The Court ascribes the
greatest degree of reliability to national sources and a lesser degree of
reliability to foreign and international legal sources.
The national sources that the Court recognizes as highly reliable
objective indicators of society’s decency standards are U.S. legislative
enactments and U.S. jury sentencing determinations. The Court terms the
results of its analysis of these national sources “the national consensus”47
and considers the “national consensus” of paramount importance. Where
national legislative enactments and national jury determinations allow for a
given punishment, the “national consensus” does not deem this punishment
cruel and unusual. Conversely, where national legislative enactments and
national jury sentencing determinations disallow a given punishment, the
“national consensus” deems this punishment cruel and unusual. Thus,
there is always a national consensus, allowing the Court to conduct its
evaluation of society’s decency standards in its self-crafted national
majoritarian analytical paradigm. 48
The national majoritarian paradigm ensures that the national consensus

47. See, e.g., id. at 562; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314; Stanford, 492 U.S. at 371; Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 848-49 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
48. Alford, Federal Courts, supra note 5, at 776, 778-80, 782-86; Alford, Misusing,
supra note 5, at 59-61; see also Alford, Postscript on Lawrence, supra note 5, at 914, 920.
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is determinative of the Court’s holding. Because the national consensus
represents the most reliable indicator of society’s decency standards, and
occupies the uppermost part of the hierarchal structure of society’s decency
standards indicia, the Court pinpoints society’s decency standards using the
national consensus as its yardstick. By rendering comparative legal sources
subsidiary to the national consensus, the national majoritarian paradigm
severely restricts their judicial value. The Court invokes comparative legal
materials only in a confirmatory capacity, to corroborate the national
consensus: comparative legal materials that accord with the national
consensus merely confirm the national consensus and comparative sources
that collide with the national consensus, necessarily yield it.49 So long as
the Court adheres to stare decisis principles and continues to evaluate
society’s decency standards within a national majortiarian analytical
framework, the national consensus will invariably trump contrary foreign
and international legal sources.50
A. The Hierarchal Structure of Objective Indicators of Society’s
Decency Standards, the Primacy of the National Consensus, and the
Sub-Primacy of National Legislative Enactments Within the
National Consensus
U.S. legislative enactments and U.S. jury sentencing determinations
form the apex of the hierarchal structure of society’s decency standards
indicia. Woodson v. North Carolina made this point explicitly, classifying
U.S. legislative enactments and U.S. jury sentencing determinations as the
“two crucial indicators of evolving standards of decency.” 51 The Supreme
Court unequivocally ascribes primacy to the national indicia of society’s

49. Alford, Misusing, supra note 5, at 59-61; see also Alford, Federal Courts, supra
note 5, at 778, 782-86; Alford, Postscript on Lawrence, supra note 5, at 914 (“The Court
has never considered international law particularly relevant. At most it has considered the
actual practice of other countries as potentially relevant to the constitutional inquiry.”).
Alford argues that a similar dynamic is at work in areas of substantive due process:
“[S]imilar to Eighth Amendment, references to global standards under the conception of
ordered liberty provides an additional check on substantive due process, to be utilized if it
already has been established that a right is part of our own history and tradition.” Alford,
Postscript on Lawrence, supra note 5, at 921; see also Alford, Misusing, supra note 5, at 59
n.17.
50. It should be noted that the Court has repeatedly reserved the option to rule contrary
to the objective indicators of society’s decency standards. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 564;
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).
Compare, however, the views of the plurality opinion and dissenting opinion in Stanford,
492 U.S. at 380, 382 (indicating the analysis of constitutionality of cruel and unusual
punishment should be a two-part test).
51. 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976).

SEGAL_CHRISTENSEN

2006]

DEATH PENALTY AND FOREIGN LAW

2/3/2011 10:21 PM

113

decency standards.
Several cases highlight the prominence of national jury sentencing
determinations in the hierarchal structure of society’s decency standards
indicia. For example, in Witherspoon v. Illinois, the Court relied heavily
on national jury sentencing determinations in assessing society’s decency
standards. 52 The Court explained that jury sentencing determinations are
essential to the Court’s evaluation of society’s decency standards because
the jury serves “as a link between contemporary community values and the
penal system.” 53 Likewise, in Furman v. Georgia, national jury sentencing
decisions served as a prime factor in the Court’s holding restricting various
arbitrary procedures in the imposition of the death penalty. 54
Much as the Court highly values national jury sentencing
determinations, it values national legislative enactments even more. The
national consensus is comprised of a two-tiered hierarchal structure
consisting most importantly of national legislative enactments and less
importantly of national jury sentencing determinations. This painstakingly
nuanced bifurcation between the two national indicators is telling; it is
reflective of the great importance of the highly-calibrated hierarchal
structure of objective indicators. The Court is eminently serious about the
varying reliability values it ascribes to the objective indicators.
It is readily apparent that the Court assigns the greatest degree of
reliability to national legislative enactments. Language indicating the
primacy of national legislative enactments litters Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence: national legislative judgments “weigh heavily,” while
national jury sentencing decisions merely represent a “significant and
reliable objective index of contemporary values.” 55 The Court further
indicates, “[t]he clearest and most reliable objective evidence of
contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s
legislatures,” though “[w]e have also looked to data concerning the actions
of sentencing juries.” 56 Additionally, as Justice Rehnquist recognized,
while “we ascribe primacy to legislative enactments,” national jury
sentencing determinations are “entitled to less weight than legislative
judgments.” 57 National legislative enactments are “the primary and most
52. 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
53. Id. at 519 n.15.
54. 408 U.S. 238 (1972); see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831-34 (1988)
(plurality opinion).
55. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175, 181 (1976).
56. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989), overruled by Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 323 (2002) (emphasis added).
57. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 323 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), overruled
by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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reliable indication of consensus.”58
Finally, as Justice Blackmun
characterized the Court’s position, the country’s legislation provides “the
best evidence” of society’s decency standards.59 While the decisions of
state legislatures are “first among” the indicia that reflect the public attitude
toward a given sanction, “[w]e have also been guided by the sentencing
decisions of juries.” 60
The order in which the Court analyzes the national indicators of
society’s decency standards further reflects both the primacy of the national
consensus and the nuanced bifurcation between the two national indicators.
For example, the plurality opinion in Thompson v. Oklahoma set the
agenda for its review by stating: “we first review relevant legislative
enactments . . . then refer to jury determinations.” 61 This order of review
set by Thompson serves as a model for other death penalty cases: they first
review national legislative enactments and only then proceed to review
national jury sentencing determinations.62
B. Indications and Illustrations of the Marginal and Confirmatory
Role of Comparative Legal Sources in Death Penalty Cases
While the Court considers national legislative enactments and national
jury sentencing determinations the two crucial indicators of society’s
decency standards, the Court regards foreign and international law with far
less deference. The primacy of the national indicia consigns comparative
legal sources to the periphery. The Court does not accord independent
judicial value to comparative legal materials; rather, it values supranational
materials only as corroboratory of the national consensus.
Case law reflects the marginal role of comparative legal sources in the
Court’s death penalty cases in several ways. These include: the patent
omission of comparative materials in some of the Court’s death penalty
decisions; 63 the minimal degree of attention the Court expends on
comparative sources as compared with national decency standards

58. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373 (1989) (plurality opinion).
59. Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119, 1119-20 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
60. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987) (emphasis added); see also Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 154 (1987) (“[S]ubstantial and recent legislative authorization of the
death penalty for the crime of felony murder . . . powerfully suggests that society does not
reject the death penalty as grossly excessive under these circumstances.”) (first emphasis
added).
61. 487 U.S. 815, 822 (1988) (plurality opinion).
62. Stanford, 492 U.S. 361; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584 (1977).
63. See infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.

SEGAL_CHRISTENSEN

2006]

DEATH PENALTY AND FOREIGN LAW

2/3/2011 10:21 PM

115

indicia; 64 the Court’s recurrent tendency to relegate comparative sources to
footnotes; 65 the conspicuous omission of comparative sources from the
Court’s agenda list of decency standards indicia it plans on considering;66
and the Court’s revealing characterizations of comparative sources as
merely confirming and supporting the national consensus.67
Perhaps the starkest indication of the non-centrality of foreign and
international law in death penalty cases is the total absence of these
materials in some of the Court’s decisions. In several cases, the Court
grapples to pinpoint society’s decency standards and fails to reference
comparative legal materials, even in a cursory fashion. For example, in
both Roberts v. Louisiana 68 and Gregg v. Georgia, 69 the Court assesses
society’s decency standards by referring exclusively to national legislation
and national jury determinations; neither decision troubles to reference
foreign and international sources. It is apparent that the Court does not
view these materials as important indicators of objective societal standards.
Yet even in cases where the Court does invoke foreign and international
legal materials as objective indicia of society’s decency standards, these
comparative materials are inessential to the Court’s decisions. This is
manifest in the highly asymmetrical degree of attention the Court expends
on comparative legal materials as compared with national decency
standards indicia. National consensus indicators almost invariably occupy
the bulk of the discussion, while foreign and international law occupy only
a minor part. 70 For example, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court’s analysis of
national legislative enactments occupies over two full pages.71 Following
this comprehensive analysis, the Court referenced the view of the world
community; 72 this reference, the only reference to foreign and international
law in Atkins, occupies less than a single sentence. 73 The degree of
attention the Court expends on each objective indicator is commensurate
with its degree of reliability; while the great degree of attention the Court
64. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
65. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text; see also Benvenuto, supra note 5, at
2711-12, 2744-45.
67. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
68. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
69. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
70. The sole exception to this pattern is Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), where
the Court devotes substantial attention to comparative materials. But see discussion infra at
pp. 15-16 (arguing that even in Roper the role of comparative materials is merely
confirmatory).
71. 536 U.S. 304, 314-17 (2002).
72. Id. at 316 n.21.
73. Id.
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lavishes on the national decency standards indicia reflects their prominence
in the Court’s analyses, the often nominal mention of comparative sources
reflects their unimportance.
Equally reflective of the non-centrality of comparative legal materials is
the Court’s recurrent tendency to relegate these sources to a footnote. In
several death penalty cases the Court placed comparative sources in
footnotes, underscoring their minimal significance.74
Another manifestation of the marginal role of comparative legal
materials in the Court’s death penalty cases is the conspicuous omission of
these sources from the Court’s agenda list of decency standards indicia it
plans on considering. Thompson v. Oklahoma instantiated this bizarre
trend. 75 Near the outset of Thompson, the Court set out its agenda of
review, listing the sources it planned on using as objective indicators of
society’s decency standards. 76 The Court listed only national legislative
enactments and national jury determinations; it noticeably omitted
comparative legal materials. 77 In the substantive analysis section of its
opinion, the Court unexpectedly broke out of the mold it set for its analysis
by adding a single paragraph that cites the death penalty practices of
several other countries alongside the views of professional organizations.78
These comparative sources are nestled in a brief, isolated paragraph
amongst extensive discussion of national legislative enactments and jury
determinations. 79 The structure employed in Thompson generates the
discrete impression that the Court referenced comparative materials as an
afterthought. National legislative enactments and national jury sentencing
decisions governed the judgment in Thompson; the references to foreign
law are far from pivotal in the Court’s multifaceted calculus. 80
Like the omission of comparative legal materials from the Court’s
agenda list, the Court’s diffident terminology in discussing supranational
legal materials also reflects their minimal role in capital punishment

74. Id.; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 n.22 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 596 n.10 (1977).
75. 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion); see also Benvenuto, supra note 5, at 271416, 2747-48.
76. Thomspon, 487 U.S.at 822-23.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 830-31.
79. Id.
80. See The International Judicial Dialogue: When Domestic Constitutional Courts Join
the Conversation, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2067-68 (2001) [hereinafter International
Judicial Dialogue] (noting that the Thompson Court did not include comparative materials
in its agenda of review and only referenced these materials after a detailed survey of
national sources); see also Benvenuto, supra note 5, at 2711-12, 2744-45.
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jurisprudence. In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court conducted a comprehensive
analysis of national legislative enactments to ascertain whether a national
consensus exists to prohibit the execution of mentally retarded persons as
cruel and unusual punishment. 81 After finding that a consensus exists, the
Court added a footnote referencing the views of the world community,
reports of professional organizations, and American opinion polls.82 The
Court considered these sundry sources “[a]dditional evidence . . . that this
legislative judgment reflects a much broader social and professional
consensus.” 83 The Court concluded its footnote by adding: “Although
these factors are by no means dispositive, their consistency with the
legislative evidence lends further support to our conclusion that there is a
consensus among those who have addressed the issue.” 84 The Court did
not suggest that the views of the world community are controlling; on the
contrary, the Court distanced itself from this position. After establishing a
national consensus based on national legislative enactments, the Court
referred to the views of the world community as additional evidence that
lends further support to the national consensus. 85
In Roper v. Simmons the Court employed terminology similar to Atkins
Roper prohibited the
in discussing comparative legal materials.86
execution of individuals who were under eighteen years of age at the time
of their capital crimes. 87 As in Atkins, the Court in Roper first set out to
determine whether a national consensus existed on this issue.88 Finding a
national consensus against the execution of offenders under eighteen, the
Court turned to the world community for corroboration of the national
consensus. 89 The Court opened its discussion of international opinion by
stating that its holding “finds confirmation in the stark reality that the
United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official

81. 536 U.S. 304, 313-16 (2002).
82. Id. at 316 n.21.
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. See Alford, Misusing, supra note 5, at 60 (“[T]he Court in Atkins found a national
consensus and then concluded that this consensus was consistent with a much broader
consensus among others who have considered the matter.”); see also Alford, Federal
Courts, supra note 5, at 779-80, 780 n.395; Alford, Postscript on Lawrence, supra note 5, at
920; cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005) (stating that in Atkins the Court found
a national consensus based on national legislative enactments and national jury sentencing
determinations).
86. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
87. Id. at 578-79.
88. Id. at 564-75.
89. Id. at 575-78.
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sanction to the juvenile death penalty.” 90 After analyzing the international
opinion on the issue, the Court stated: “The opinion of the world
community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and
significant confirmation for our own conclusions.” 91 Though Roper
engaged in an extensive discussion of comparative legal materials, the
Court nevertheless expressly valued these sources only inasmuch as they
confirmed the national consensus. In fact, the Court included four detailed
appendices relating to national legislative enactments to corroborate its
finding of a national consensus. 92 As in Atkins, the Roper Court disclaimed
any intent to regard international opinion as controlling. Also as in Atkins,
the Court in Roper first established a national consensus and referred to
international opinion only to find confirmation for the national consensus.
Coker v. Georgia 93 furnishes a neat illustration of the hierarchal
structure of objective indicators of society’s standards and the minimal
value the Court assigns to comparative materials in its evaluation of these
decency standards. Ehrlich Anthony Coker was convicted of rape and
sentenced to death in Georgia. 94 In a plurality opinion, the Court ruled that
the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of rape constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment. 95
Toward the beginning of its analysis, Coker stated that Eighth
Amendment judgments should not be rooted in the “subjective views of
individual justices”; rather, “judgment should be informed by objective
factors to the maximum possible extent.”96 Coker continued, “[t]o this end,
attention must be given to the public attitudes concerning a particular
sentence—history and precedent, legislative attitudes, and the response of
juries reflected in their sentencing decisions are to be consulted.”97 In
support of choosing these objective indicators in making its Eighth
Amendment determinations, Coker pointed to Gregg, which based its
decision largely on national legislative attitudes and national jury
sentencing decisions. 98
Having meticulously set the agenda for its assessment, Coker launched
into an extensive analysis of national legislative enactments. 99 This
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 575 (emphasis added).
Id. at 578 (emphasis added).
Id. at 579-86.
433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 586.
Id. at 592.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 593-97.
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analysis occupies over two full pages of the Court’s opinion. 100 The Court
summed up its analysis by stating that “[t]he current judgment with respect
to the death penalty for rape . . . obviously weighs very heavily on the side
of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult
woman.” 101
Then, inexplicably deviating from the agenda the Court set for itself,
Coker followed its review of legislative enactments with an isolated
footnote, stating:
In Trop v. Dulles . . . the plurality took pains to note the climate of
international opinion concerning the acceptability of a particular
punishment. It is thus not irrelevant here that out of 60 major nations in
the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for rape
where death did not ensue. 102

This lone statement, consigned to a footnote and based on a single survey,
represents the sole reference to comparative legal sources, one in which the
Court noted that it considered international opinion “not irrelevant” to its
assessment of cruel and unusual punishment. 103
Returning to its agenda, Coker proceeded to review the sentencing
decisions of U.S. juries, arguing that it is “important to look to the
sentencing decisions that [American] juries have made in the course of
assessing whether capital punishment is an appropriate penalty for the
crime being tried.” 104 The Court then reviewed jury sentencing decisions
and inferred that in the vast majority of cases, U.S. juries have not imposed
the death sentence for the crime of rape.105 Coker’s review of national jury
sentencing decisions marked the conclusion of the Court’s inquiry into
society’s decency standards.
Coker is instructive. The Court referenced three objective indicators of
society’s decency standards: national legislative enactments, national jury
sentencing decisions, and international opinion. As in Atkins, the Court
expended the overwhelming part of its inquiry on national legislative
enactments and national jury sentencing determinations. 106 The Court also
considered legislative enactments before jury sentencing determinations.
This is consistent both with the Court’s oft-proclaimed view that national
legislative enactments constitute the most important objective indicator of
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id. at 596.
Id. at 596 n.10 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 596.
Id. at 595-98.
See supra p. 13.
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society’s decency standards, 107 and with the trajectory of review set forth in
Thompson v. Oklahoma. 108 The Court omitted international opinion from
its list of the objective indicators it intended to review, first mentioning
international opinion in a footnote of its decision,109 a pattern seen in
Thompson v. Oklahoma. 110 As in Atkins, when the Court factored
international opinion into its equation, it allotted international opinion a
single, isolated footnote. 111 In fact, the Court justified its use of
comparative materials by stating that they are “not irrelevant here”––a far
cry from the critical value of the sources comprising the national
consensus. 112
Like Coker, Enmund v. Florida also illustrates the minimal value the
Court assigns to non-U.S. legal sources in assessing society’s decency
standards. Enmund presented an Eighth Amendment proportionality issue:
whether the Eighth Amendment permits the imposition of the death penalty
on a defendant who merely aids and abets a felony during which a murder
is committed by another, but who does not commit murder, attempt to
commit murder, or even intend that the murder take place. 113 The Court
held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty in these circumstances.114
As Coker modeled its agenda of review after Gregg, Enmund modeled
its agenda of review after Coker. 115 Enmund thus purposefully followed
Coker’s trajectory. It opened with a thorough analysis of national
legislative enactments, concluding that the majority of national legislative
enactments reject capital punishment in the circumstances presented in the
Following its several-page review of national legislative
case. 116
enactments, Enmund focused on the sentencing decisions of U.S. juries,
noting that “[t]he evidence is overwhelming that American juries have
repudiated imposition of the death penalty for crimes such as [the]
petitioners.” 117
Before concluding its inquiry into society’s standards of decency,

107. See supra pp. 10-11.
108. 487 U.S. 815, 822, 830 (1988) (plurality opinion). See supra p. 11.
109. Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 n.10.
110. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 822 n.4. See discussion supra pp. 13-14. This pattern is also
found in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313, 316 n.21 (2002).
111. 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (2002). See supra p. 14.
112. See International Judicial Dialogue, supra note 80, at 2090 n.105.
113. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 783-88 (1982).
114. Id. at 788.
115. Id. at 788-89.
116. Id. at 789.
117. Id. at 794.
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however, the Court added one footnote. 118 The footnote cited Coker,
stating that international opinion is “not irrelevant” and proceeded to state:
“the doctrine of felony murder has been abolished in England and India,
severely restricted in Canada and a number of other Commonwealth
countries, and is unknown in continental Europe.” 119
Enmund yields a picture identical to Coker. Enmund first considered
national legislative enactments and then considered national jury
sentencing decisions. These national indicators form the linchpin of the
Court’s rationale, and the Court naturally expended the overwhelming part
of its inquiry into society’s decency standards analyzing these sources.
Only then, in a lone footnote, did the Court turn to international opinion,
since international opinion is “not irrelevant” to the inquiry. 120
C. The Inability of Comparative Legal Sources to Trump the
National Consensus
The preceding sections of this Part demonstrated that the primacy of the
national consensus in the Court’s hierarchal structure of objective
indicators of society’s decency standards ensures that comparative legal
materials carry little judicial weight. Where comparative legal sources are
congruent with the national consensus, they merely serve to confirm the
Court’s perception of society’s decency standards, a perception molded by
an evaluation of national legislative enactments and national jury
determinations. This section demonstrates the converse ramification of the
national majoritarian paradigm: because the Court ascribes the greatest
value to national indicators of society’s decency standards, contrary
comparative legal materials cannot trump the national consensus. 121
The Court’s national majoritarian paradigm incapacitates foreign and
international law from overruling the national consensus. In some cases,
the Court finds it unnecessary to articulate this position. For example, in
Gregg v. Georgia the Court did not even consider foreign and international
law in evaluating society’s evolving decency standards. 122 This is hardly
accidental. In Gregg, the Court held that the imposition of capital
punishment is not per se unconstitutional; in other words, Gregg
legitimized the imposition of the death penalty in the United States. 123 In
118. Id. at 794 n.22.
119. Id.
120. See International Judicial Dialogue, supra note 80, at 2090 n.105.
121. See Alford, Misusing, supra note 5, at 59-61; see also Alford, Postscript on
Lawrence, supra note 5, at 914, 920.
122. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
123. Id. at 187.
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this context, foreign and international law would likely show that the
broader society’s decency standards disallow the imposition of the death
penalty, contrary to the national consensus. Operating within a national
majoritarian paradigm, the Court naturally considered supranational
materials irrelevant.
In other cases, however, a dissenting opinion prompted the Court to
verbalize its position that the national consensus, not comparative legal
sources, determines society’s decency standards. The plurality opinion in
Stanford v. Kentucky offers the clearest articulation of the absolute
ascendancy of the national consensus over foreign and international law.124
In Stanford, the dissenting opinion considered comparative materials in
assessing society’s decency standards. 125 Responding to the dissent, the
Court stated:
We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are
dispositive, rejecting the contention of petitioners and their various amici
(accepted by the dissent) that the sentencing practices of other countries
are relevant. While “the practices of other nations, particularly other
democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a practice uniform
among our people is not merely a historical accident, but rather so
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ that it occupies a place not
merely in our mores, but, text permitting, in our Constitution as well,”
they cannot serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite,
that the practice is accepted among our people. 126

As Roger P. Alford notes, Stanford v. Kentucky provides a graphic
example of the national majoritarian dynamic disallowing comparative
legal materials from superceding the national consensus. 127 According to
the Stanford plurality, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence requires that a
threshold national consensus be established before it considers foreign law
124. 492 U.S. 361, 370 n.1 (1989) (plurality opinion).
125. Id. at 389-90 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Note that even the dissent first looks to
national indicators of society’s decency standards before turning to the legislation of foreign
countries. Id. at 383-87; see also Benvenuto, supra note 5, at 2713-14, 2746 (discussing the
dissenting opinion of Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993-99 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)); Blackmun, supra note 4, at 48 (“If the substance of the Eighth Amendment is
to turn on the evolving standards of decency of the civilized world, there can be no
justification for limiting judicial inquiry to the opinions of the United States.”).
126. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370 n.1 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 86869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting)) (citations omitted). Based on Stanford, the
confirmatory role of comparative legal materials serves as an additional check on the Eighth
Amendment in ensuring that the national consensus is not simply accidental but that the
prohibition is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Alford, Misusing, supra note 5 at
60.
127. Alford, Misusing, supra note 5, at 60; see also Alford, Federal Courts, supra note 5,
at 779-80, Alford, Postscript on Lawrence, supra note 5, at 919-20.
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relevant to its decisions. 128 As Alford states, Stanford illustrates that “[t]he
practice abroad is relevant only after uniformity has been established at
home.” 129 Supranational law contrary to the national consensus is banished
from the calculus. 130
Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Knight v. Florida further
demonstrates that comparative legal sources cannot trump a divergent
national consensus. 131 In Knight, petitioners Knight and Moore argued that
execution after having languished twenty years on death row constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment. 132 In support of their position, Knight and
Moore cited foreign law. 133 Though the Court denied certiorari, Justice
Breyer filed a dissenting opinion arguing that the Court should grant
certiorari based in part on the foreign law cited by the petitioners.134
Justice Thomas countered Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion by stating:
I write only to point out that I am unaware of any support in the American
constitutional tradition or in this Court’s precedent for the proposition that
a defendant can avail himself of the panoply of appellate and collateral
procedures and then complain when his execution is delayed. Indeed,
were there any such support in our own jurisprudence, it would be
unnecessary for proponents of the claim to rely on the European Court of
Human Rights, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the Supreme Court of
India, or the Privy Council. 135

Justice Thomas maintained that citations consisting exclusively of foreign
law demonstrate a “negative” national consensus, i.e. a consensus that
execution following twenty years on death row is not cruel and unusual
punishment. 136 Once this “negative” national consensus is established,
foreign law becomes impotent; it cannot override a contrary national
consensus. 137

128. See International Judicial Dialogue, supra note 80, at 2068 (commenting on
Stanford that “[t]he Court’s previous capital punishment cases support the claim that the
Court must first establish a basis for its decision in American practice and precedent”).
129. Alford, Federal Courts, supra note 5, at 778 (arguing based on Stanford that
society’s evolving standards “are determined based on a national consensus” and “[t]he
practice of other nations is relevant only after uniformity has been established within the
United States”); see also Alford, Postscript on Lawrence, supra note 5, at 920.
130. See International Judicial Dialogue, supra note 80, at 2067-68.
131. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990-93 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 990.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 993-99 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring).
136. Id.
137. Even Justice Breyer does not argue that comparative legal sources should control the
Court’s decision. Id. at 996 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Obviously this foreign authority does
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In Foster v. Florida the Court revisited the issue presented by Knight.138
Following his death sentence, Charles Kenneth Foster languished over
twenty-seven years in prison. 139 He petitioned the Court for a writ of
certiorari, arguing that execution following twenty-seven years on death
row constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 140 Once again, the Court
denied certiorari; once again, Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion
arguing that the Court should grant certiorari based in part on foreign law;
and once again, Justice Thomas responded to Justice Breyer’s dissent.141
Justice Thomas referenced his concurring opinion in Knight and added that
“[t]his Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose foreign
moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.” 142 In effect, Justice Thomas
maintained that, absent a prerequisite national consensus, foreign law is
irrelevant in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.143 Foreign law cannot
impose its views on Americans; it cannot supercede a conflicting national
consensus.
Another line of cases that demonstrates the inability of foreign and
international law to trump the national consensus begins with Thompson v.
Oklahoma and continues through Atkins v. Virginia and Roper v.
Simmons. 144 In these cases, it is the dissenting opinion that demonstrates
the primacy of national sources over supranational sources. This line of
cases contains the following distinctive pattern. The leading opinion
argues that a national consensus considers a given punishment cruel and
unusual. 145 It confirms this national consensus by citing comparative legal
materials. 146 The leading opinion prompts a vituperative dissenting
opinion––headed by Justice Scalia––arguing that the Court has failed to
establish a national consensus. 147 The dissent opens by challenging the

not bind us.”); see also Blum, supra note 1, at 180-83 (arguing that Justice Breyer uses
foreign materials merely to illustrate the need to consider the propriety of delayed
executions, and does not use these sources in constitutional interpretation).
138. Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002).
139. Id. at 991 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 992.
141. Id. at 990-95.
142. Id. at 990 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324-25 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting)) (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 991.
144. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 304
(2002); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion).
145. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-68; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313-16; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 82631.
146. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575-78; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830.
147. Roper, 543 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 337-38 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 859 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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leading opinion’s rationale in interpreting the statistical data underlying its
alleged national consensus. 148 In dismantling the leading opinion’s
“national consensus” disallowing the punishment in question, the dissent
argues that in fact the national consensus permits the punishment in
question. 149 Having established a “negative” national consensus, the
dissent turns to the comparative legal materials cited by the leading
opinion. 150 The dissent then duly discards these materials as irrelevant
since dissonant comparative materials cannot trump the national
consensus. 151 In the words of Justice Scalia, “where there is not first a
settled consensus among our own people, the views of other nations . . .
cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution.” 152
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE MARGINALITY OF COMPARATIVE LEGAL
SOURCES FOR THE KOH/ALFORD DEBATE: SHOULD COMPARATIVE
MATERIALS TRUMP THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS IN EIGHTH
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE?
As is well-known, a majority of the world’s nations disallows the
imposition of the death penalty. 153 In particular, the Western world has
vehemently condemned capital punishment.154 This strong opposition to
capital punishment has become a cornerstone of the European human rights
movement. 155
Opponents of the United States’ continued imposition of the death
penalty exploit the almost universal condemnation of capital
punishment. 156 They argue that the Court should be more receptive of
148. Roper, 543 U.S. at 609-15; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 342-48; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 86772.
149. Roper, 543 U.S. at 609-15; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 342-48; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 86772.
150. Roper, 543 U.S. at 622; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347-48; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868 n.4.
151. Roper, 543 U.S. at 622-28; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347-48; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868
n.4.
152. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868 n.4.
153. See, e.g., sources cited in Alford, Federal Courts, supra note 5, at 776 n.373; Nora
V. Demleitner, The Death Penalty in the United States Following European Lead?, 81 OR.
L. REV. 131 (2002); Harold Hongju Koh, Paying “Decent Respect” to World Opinion on
the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1085 (2002) [hereinafter Koh, Paying Decent
Respect]; James H. Wyman, Comment, Vengeance is Whose?: The Death Penalty and
Cultural Relativism in International Law, 6 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 543 (1997).
154. See, e.g., Alford, Federal Courts, supra note 5, at 776 n.373; Demleitner, supra note
153; Koh, Paying Decent Respect, supra note 153; Wyman, supra note 153.
155. See, e.g., Alford, Federal Courts, supra note 5, at 776 n.373; Demleitner, supra note
153; Koh, Paying Decent Respect, supra note 153; Wyman, supra note 153.
156. Koh, International Law, supra note 5, at 56; see also Blackmun, supra note 4; Koh,
Paying Decent Respect, supra note 153.

SEGAL_CHRISTENSEN

126

2/3/2011 10:21 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXIII

foreign and international law in deciding death penalty cases. 157 In effect,
they maintain that foreign and international law should trump a national
consensus allowing the death penalty. 158 For example, Harold Hongju
Koh, an ardent death penalty abolitionist and chief spokesperson for the
internationalists, has expressly stated the practices of other democratic
nations should “constitute the most relevant evidence of what Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence calls the ‘evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.’” 159
Roger P. Alford has countered the position of the international
majoritarians. 160 Alford maintains that the predominance of national
sources arises from the Court’s deep-seated respect for principles of
federalism and American sovereignty. 161 He warns that “[u]sing global
opinions as a means of constitutional interpretation dramatically
undermines sovereignty.” 162 Recognizing that the Court employs a
national majoritarian framework in its death penalty cases, Alford insists
that global sources inconsistent with the national consensus cannot
prevail. 163 Alford argues that granting primacy to foreign and international
legal sources will wrongfully undermine the Court’s well-settled precedent
and unjustly thwart the sovereign will of the American people.164 Alford
157. Blackmun, supra note 4; see also Koh, International Law, supra note 5, at 56; Koh,
Paying Decent Respect, supra note 153.
158. Blackmun, supra note 4; see also Koh, International Law, supra note 5, at 56; Koh,
Paying Decent Respect, supra note 153.
159. Blackmun, supra note 4; see also Koh, International Law, supra note 5, at 56
(quoting Trop v. Dulles, 365 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)) (emphasis added);
Koh, Paying Decent Respect, supra note 153.
160. Alford, Federal Courts, supra note 5, at 772-91; see also Alford, Misusing, supra
note 5, at 58-61. For Koh’s response to Alford, see Koh, International Law, supra note 5, at
55; for Alford’s reply to Koh’s response, see Alford, Misusing, supra note 5, at 61 n.30.
161. Alford, Federal Courts, supra note 5, at 785-86; Alford, Misusing, supra note 5, at
59-61; cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 322-28 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
162. Alford, Misusing, supra note 5, at 58; see also Benvenuto, supra note 5, at 2697,
2711-20, 2742-51 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s use of foreign precedent has been
rhetorical rather than substantive); Raalf, supra note 5, at 1260-63 (arguing that comparative
materials have had little or no influence in constitutional jurisprudence). Several
commentators have also stated that the Court does not view comparative law as inherently
significant but rather as a mere source for empirical data. See, e.g., Paolo G. Carozza, “My
Friend Is a Stranger”: The Death Penalty and the Global Ius Commune of Human Rights,
81 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1086-87 (2003); Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of
Continuities and Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE. L.J. 223, 226, 247
(2001); Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational
Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499, 526
(2000).
163. Alford, Misusing, supra note 5, at 59-61; see also Alford, Federal Courts, supra
note 5, at 784-85.
164. Alford, Misusing, supra note 5, at 59-61.
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concludes:
In short, the international countermajoritarian difficulty severely limits the
degree of respect that can be shown to the global opinions of humanity
when doing so shows disrespect to our own national experience . . . .
Reliance on global standards of decency undermines the sovereign
limitations inherent in federalist restraints, limitations born out of respect
for the reserved powers of the states to assess which punishments are
appropriate for which crimes.
To the extent that international
majoritarians argue that global standards are relevant notwithstanding
their inconsistency with American standards, this view reflects far less
respect for federalism concerns than required by the Court. 165

This Comment’s analysis of death penalty cases supports Alford’s
contention that granting supremacy to comparative legal sources over the
national consensus runs counter to the Court’s death penalty decisions.
Because the Court consistently operates within a national majoritarian
paradigm in evaluating society’s decency standards, allowing foreign and
international law to override the national consensus negates the U.S.
common law tradition.166
IV. THE MARGINALITY OF COMPARATIVE LEGAL SOURCES IN
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS RELATING TO ALL AREAS OF
JURISPRUDENCE
Several commentators emphasize the limited utility that the Supreme
Court has derived from comparative legal sources in all areas of
jurisprudence. They maintain that, in general, comparative legal sources
have been immaterial to the Court’s decisions. For example, Mark Tushnet
forcefully states that “[p]rior to Lawrence v. Texas, no recent Supreme
Court decision relied on non-U.S. constitutional or para-constitutional law
to support a proposition that was material to the majority’s analysis.”167
Similarly, Sarah K. Harding surveyed the cases between 1993-2003 in
which the Court cited laws of the United Kingdom, Canada, Austria, and
New Zealand. 168 Harding makes the sweeping observation that “in all of
these cases, the foreign law appeared as nothing more than a polite
reference,” and that “there was no extended discussion of the foreign law

165. Id. at 60-61.
166. On the consistency of the Court regarding the role of comparative legal materials in
death penalty decisions, see, for example, Alford, Federal Courts, supra note 5, at 779.
167. Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, supra note 1, at 241; see also
id. at 244 (“The current Court’s first use of non-U.S. law to support a position relevant to its
disposition came in Lawrence v. Texas . . . .”).
168. Harding, supra note 5, at 419-20.
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being cited.” 169 Harding concludes, “[i]n short, the U.S. Supreme Court
and U.S. courts in general seldom cite foreign law.” 170
Recently, Louis J. Blum analyzed the purposes for which the Court has
invoked foreign and international law.171 Blum concludes that in recent
cases comparative legal materials were never central to the Court’s
decisions and that unfailingly the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution
stands independent of any supranational support.172 Blum maintains that
“[f]oreign materials are used only to clarify, or lend support to, the
reasoning behind discrete steps in the interpretive process.” 173
Blum corroborates his argument with numerous cases. 174 For example,
Blum analyzes the Court’s use of comparative legal materials in Culombe
v. Connecticut. 175 Blum argues that the Court’s decision is ultimately
grounded in U.S. precedent and that the Court used foreign law in Culombe
merely to support the threshold necessity of the constitutional analysis.176
Likewise, Blum argues that the Court’s decision in Washington v.
Glucksberg rests firmly on U.S. precedent and that the Court used foreign
legal materials merely to facilitate its determination that deviation from
U.S. precedent is unwarranted. 177
Blum goes a step further, however. According to Blum, it is not
incidental that foreign and international law are peripheral to the Court’s
decisions; rather, the impact of the comparative materials on constitutional
interpretation is necessarily limited. 178 Blum explains that because the

169. Id. at 420-21.
170. Id. at 420. Glensy argues with these commentators and maintains that the Court
integrates comparative references within its broader analysis. Glensy, supra note 5, at 37273. Even if Glensy is correct, however, the Court’s integration of comparative materials
within the broader analysis does not mean that these sources contributed significantly to the
Court’s decision. A similar error is made by David Fontana in his reply to Tushnet. See
generally Fontana, The Next Generation, supra note 5. Tushnet argues that “[p]rior to
Lawrence v. Texas, no recent Supreme Court decision relied on non-U.S. constitutional or
para-constitutional law to support a proposition that was material to the majority’s analysis.”
Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, supra note 1, at 241. In response,
Fontana points to many cases where the Court’s majority opinion cited comparative
materials. Fontana, The Next Generation, supra note 5, at 451-57. Again, the majority
opinion’s citation of comparative materials does not per se render these materials essential
to its analysis or decisions.
171. See generally Blum, supra note 1.
172. Id. at 171.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 173-94.
175. 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Blum, supra note 1, at 173-79.
176. Blum, supra note 1, at 175-79.
177. 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Blum, supra note 1, at 187-92.
178. Blum, supra note 1, passim.
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Court operates within an interpretive framework based on precedent, its
prior decisions are necessarily central, while the decisions of supranational
legal sources are necessarily ancillary. 179 Blum elaborates:
Comparative materials, when used within the common law framework,
and in the manner that courts have employed them, may be thought of as a
lens and nothing more. Comparative materials do not act on the
Constitution or the domestic experience . . . . Because comparative
materials do not alter the interaction between the Constitution and the
American people, our understanding of the Constitution remains rooted in
purely domestic sources. 180

Thus, since the Court engages in comparative analysis only within the
context of an interpretive framework grounded in precedent, Blum argues
that the judicial impact of foreign and international law is limited from the
outset; the common law framework itself suppresses the influence of
foreign experiences. 181
To a limited extent, this Comment’s narrow analysis of the Court’s death
penalty cases supports the broad argument of these commentators. It
marshals additional cases—indeed the entirety of capital punishment
jurisprudence—where foreign and international law are peripheral to the
Court’s decisions.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most controversial jurisprudential issue of recent years
concerns the United States Supreme Court’s use of foreign and
international law to interpret the United States Constitution. Citations to
foreign and international law in death penalty cases have contributed
greatly to this stormy controversy. Nevertheless, an analysis of the High
Court’s capital punishment cases demonstrates that the sensational degree
of controversy belies the judicial significance of these citations.
The Court maintains that the scope of “cruel and unusual punishment”
depends on society’s evolving standards of decency. The Court thus
marshals objective indicators of society’s decency standards to determine

179. Id. at 166.
180. Id. at 199.
181. Id. at 197-98. Arguably, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), represents the
Court’s most aggressive use of non-U.S. legal materials in recent years. Yet some scholars
downplay the judicial significance of the non-U.S. legal materials even in Lawrence. For
example, after meticulously analyzing the Lawrence decision, Gerald L. Neuman maintains
that comparative legal materials did not govern the Court’s decision but functioned “as
merely one element of a complex inquiry into constitutional meaning.” Neuman, supra note
5, at 89-90.
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the constitutionality of a given punishment. These objective indicators
include national legislative enactments, national jury sentencing
determinations, and foreign and international law.
Though the Court cites foreign and international law in its death penalty
decisions, the judicial impact of these materials has been exceptionally
limited. In the Court’s death penalty cases, comparative legal materials
function, if at all, as a minor consideration in a multifaceted analysis. The
Court considers the objective indicators of society’s decency standards of
unequal degrees of reliability and, accordingly, grants them varying
degrees of judicial weight. In determining the meaning of “cruel and
unusual punishment,” the Court consistently employs the national
consensus analytical paradigm. The national consensus consists of national
legislative enactments and national jury sentencing determinations. As the
case law reflects in a multiplicity of ways, the Court considers the national
consensus dominant and regards supranational legal sources as subsidiary.
In the constellation of objective indicators, comparative legal sources are
the least important. By ascribing primacy to the national consensus, the
Court severely restricts the judicial utility of foreign and international law,
for the Court’s decision must ultimately hinge on the national consensus.
Where foreign and international law accord with the national consensus,
these comparative materials merely confirm the national consensus;
conversely, where foreign and international law collide with the national
consensus, these comparative materials yield to the national consensus.
Because the Court consistently sustains the national majoritarian
paradigm in its death penalty cases, arguments by death penalty
abolitionists advocating the supremacy of supranational law over the
national consensus negate the Court’s tradition. The conclusions of this
Comment’s narrow analysis of the Court’s death penalty cases comport
with the conclusions of several commentators who emphasize the limited
impact of comparative legal materials on the Court’s decisions in all areas
of jurisprudence.

